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Note 
GATS Regulation for Launch Services: Resolving 
the United States-India Conflict 
Shane Fitzmaurice 
A long time ago, when only the Soviet Union and the United 
States operated in outer space, launch services were far too 
limited to be a concern for international trade.1 The militarily-
focused space programs prevented any commercialization.2 
However, the growth of telecommunications changed the 
picture.3 Upon venturing into the final frontier, mankind created 
a space industry worth hundreds of billions of dollars.4 
The demand for telecommunications—television, telephone, 
radio, and internet5—motivated other countries to start 
launching satellites into orbit.6 Concomitantly, companies 
 
  Shane Fitzmaurice is J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota 
Law School for the class of 2018. Fitzmaurice received his B.A. in Economics 
and Spanish from the University of Wisconsin, Madison in 2015. 
 1. Stephan Hobe, The Impact of New Developments on International Space 
Law (New Actors, Commercialisation, Privatisation, Increase in the Number of 
“Space-faring Nations”), 15 UNIFORM L. REV. 869, 869–70 (2010). 
 2. Id. (“Space activities were strictly government-led, with a strong 
military foundation, both in what was then the Soviet Union and the United 
States of America . . . .”). 
 3. See id. at 872 (“[T]elecommunications is by far the most lucrative space 
application.”). 
 4. Fed. Aviation Admin. Office of Comm. Space Transp., Ann. 
Compendium of Comm. Space Transp.: 2016, at 1 (2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2016_
Compendium.pdf [hereinafter FAAOCST] (“The size of the global space 
industry . . . is estimated to be about $324 billion.”). 
 5. Telecommunications Satellites, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, http://www.
esa.int/Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Telecom
munications_satellites (last updated Dec. 10, 2012) (explaining the various 
services of telecommunications); What is the Telecommunications Sector?, 
INVESTOPEDIA (July 8, 2015, 10:11 AM EDT), http://www.investopedia.com/
ask/answers/070815/what-telecommunications-sector.asp. 
 6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Howell, Arianespace: Satellite Launch Company, 
SPACE.COM (Apr. 11, 2017, 3:26 PM ET), http://www.space.com/36332-
arianespace.html (explaining that Arianespace was created to offer 
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around the world involved in space activities have enjoyed great 
success.7 
In the United States, for example, small satellite 
(“smallsat”) companies are booming.8 However, there is not 
enough domestic launching infrastructure to meet their 
demand.9 Currently, smallsats can only reach orbit if they hitch 
a ride with larger payloads.10 Smallsat companies strongly 
prefer to be the primary payload so they can set their own launch 
dates.11 
India owns and operates the world’s most coveted smallsat 
launcher, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV).12 The 
United States is willing to let its smallsat companies freely 
launch on the PSLV so long as India signs the Commercial Space 
 
telecommunications services and has shareholders from multiple European 
countries); Genesis, INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORG., http://www.isro.gov.in/
about-isro/genesis (last visited May 27, 2017) (explaining that I.S.R.O.’s 
development focused on telecommunications). 
 7. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., The Space Economy at a Glance 
2014: Highlights, at 4 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/sti/futures/space-economy-at-
a-glance-2014-highlights.pdf [hereinafter OECD]. 
 8. Peter B. de Selding, U.S. Launch Companies Lobby to Maintain Ban on 
Indian Rockets, SPACENEWS.COM (Mar. 29, 2016), http://spacenews.com/u-s-
space-transport-companies-lobby-to-maintain-ban-on-use-of-indian-rockets/ 
(“The U.S. small satellite industry has taken off in recent years, with several 
companies moving quickly from aspiration to execution.”). 
 9. Aditya Madanapalle, Isro PSLV-C37 Mission: The US Private Sector Is 
Threatened by Cheap Indian Spaceflight, FIRSTPOST (Feb. 10, 2017 10:27 IST), 
http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/isro-pslv-c37-mission-the-us-private-
sector-is-threatened-by-cheap-indian-spaceflight-361706.html (“US industries 
make a steady stream of satellites, but they do not have enough launch vehicles 
to place all of them to orbit.”). 
 10. See Selding, supra note 8 (“[Launch service] companies have said 
options are limited for satellites whose size means they can never order, on their 
own, a full U.S. launch vehicle in today’s market . . . . The larger rockets, which 
occasionally make room for secondary passengers, launch when their larger 
primary passengers are ready, not before.”). 
 11. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2 (“[T]he value is in scheduling; small 
satellite operators, especially those with constellations of many satellites, can 
have greater control over their business plans.”). 
 12. See Michael Safi, India Launches Record-Breaking 104 Satellites from 
Single Rocket, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2017, 6:45 EST) https://www.theguardian.
com/science/2017/feb/15/india-launches-record-breaking-104-satellites-from-
single-rocket (“The [PSLV] launch helps to cement India’s place as a serious 
player in the burgeoning private space market, expected to significantly grow 
as the demand for telecommunications services increases.”); R. S. Venkatesh, 
PSLV – Travel Beyond the Blue, VIKATAN.COM (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:39 PM), 
http://www.vikatan.com/news/english/80953-pslv--the-travel-beyond-the-blue-
isro-vikataninfographic.html (illustrating that the PSLV is a global vehicle). 
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Launch Act (CSLA),13 which prohibits India from selling launch 
services at cheaper prices than those offered by the United 
States.14 The United States, for its part, fears that freely 
importing launch services risks the very existence of its own 
launch industry.15 India, however, has refused to sign the 
CSLA.16 
The ongoing conflict between India and the United States is 
not the first in the international trade of launch services.17 
Regulation in this arena is long overdue. Without it, the evolving 
launch-service landscape threatens to aggravate the problem. 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is 
well-equipped to put an end to the tension that exists in the 
international trade of launch services. This note examines the 
United States-India conflict, which is a microcosm of the 
international situation, through the lens of the GATS. 
Section I provides background on the international launch 
service industry, the United States-India conflict, other similar 
conflicts within the international trade of launch services, space 
law, and the GATS. Section II analyzes why regulation of launch 
services is necessary and how the GATS can facilitate the 
international trade of launch services by carefully examining the 
United States–India conflict and debunking the typical 
misconceptions that arise in this context. 
 
 
 
 13. Michael J. Listner, India’s Commercial Space Conundrum, SPACE 
THOUGHTS (July 6, 2016), https://spacethoughtsblog.wordpress.com/2016/07/
06/indias-commercial-space-conundrum/. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Selding, supra note 8, (“[T]he FAA said it agreed with its Commercial 
Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) that Indian launch 
services, owned and controlled by the Indian government, threaten to ‘distort 
the conditions of competition’ in the launch-services market.”). 
 16. Listner, supra note 13. 
 17. See, e.g., Timothy A. Brooks, Regulating International Trade in Launch 
Services, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 59, 68 (1991) (“[T]he European Space Agency (ESA), 
in keeping with its criticism of NASA’s failure to separate the commercial and 
research elements of its program, transferred its launch services to the French 
corporation Arianespace in March 1980.”). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL LAUNCH SERVICE INDUSTRY 
The need for telecommunication satellites in orbit led to the 
development of a global industry that dedicates itself to 
launching satellites into outer space.18 A “launch service” 
includes everything from “contract signing through mission 
management and on-orbit delivery.”19 Initially, only a few 
countries could sell launch services because the required 
technology was too advanced.20 As technology became more 
accessible, more countries started launching satellites.21 
Nowadays, many countries reach orbit on a frequent basis; 
several European countries do so through their private 
launching service Arianespace,22 and India does so through its 
government-run Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).23 
China and Japan also launch on a regular basis,24 and many 
other countries are eager to follow suit.25 
The global space economy, largely driven by demand for 
 
 18. See Hobe, supra note 1, at 872. 
 19. About ILS, ILS, http://www.ilslaunch.com/about-us (last visited Jan. 
28, 2017). 
 20. See OECD, supra note 7, at 4 (“During the cold war, major scientific and 
engineering breakthroughs took place in different parts of the world, often in 
isolation, as military research and development and industrial secrecy forced 
economies to preserve their own technological advances.”). 
 21. Id. (“In the 1980s, only a handful of countries had the capacity to build 
and launch a satellite. Many more countries and corporate players across a wide 
range of industrial sectors are now engaged in space related activities, a trend 
that is expected to strengthen in the future.”). 
 22. Hobe, supra note 1, at 15; Howell, supra note 6. 
 23. About ISRO, DEP’T OF INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORG., http://www.isro.
gov.in/about-isro (last visited July 22, 2017). 
 24. See PETER VAN FENEMA, Legal Aspects of Launch Services and Space 
Transportation, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 382, 394–95 (Frans von der Dunk 
& Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015). 
 25. See id. at 396 (showing that the list of countries that have performed at 
least one successful launch has grown to include Brazil, Iran, Israel, North 
Korea, and South Korea). 
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telecommunications,26 is skyrocketing.27 Its value was estimated 
in 2005 to be between $170–234 billion.28 Only a decade later, 
the value of the space economy reached about $324 billion.29 
The tremendous growth has resulted, in part, from the 
world reaching orbit more frequently.30 The constant need for 
internet connectivity has required an ever-increasing amount of 
satellites in space.31 India, for example, offers huge potential 
market for satellite industries because it has a sizable 
population but much of it is does not yet connect to the 
internet.32 Experts predict that launches around the world will 
increase by thirty percent in order to accommodate for countries 
such as India.33 
Although the space economy has grown remarkably and 
continues to grow,34 the commercial launch service market has 
not kept pace.35 This is because the launching infrastructure is 
not yet equipped to meet the latent demand generated by 
smallsat companies.36 Currently, these smallsats must hitch a 
ride on launches carrying larger payloads.37 This is suboptimal 
 
 26. Gary Oleson, Effects of Changing Economics on Space Architecture and 
Engineering, THE SPACE REVIEW (May 16, 2016), http://www.thespacereview.
com/article/2986/1 (“Commercial markets make up more than three-quarters of 
space industry markets, mostly driven by global telecommunications.”); see also 
The Space Report 2016, SPACE FOUNDATION (2016), https://www.space
foundation.org/sites/default/files/downloads/The_Space_Report_2016_overview
.pdf (explaining that the commercial sector, consisting of telecommunications, 
broadcasting, and Earth observation, constitutes the largest sector). 
 27. The Space Report 2010 Reveals Global Space Economy Grew 40 Percent 
Over Five Years, SPACE FOUNDATION (Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Space Report 
2010], https://www.spacefoundation.org/media/press-releases/space-report-
2010-reveals-global-space-economy-grew-40-percent-over-five-years. 
 28. OECD, The Space Economy at a Glance 2007: Highlights, at 15 (2007), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264040847-en. 
 29. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 1. 
 30. See id. (“[T]he annual number of orbital launches conducted worldwide 
has steadily increased.”). 
 31. Kyunghee Park et al., High Hopes for Satellites, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, May 23, 2016, at 19. 
 32. Id. at 20. 
 33. Id. at 19. 
 34. OECD, supra note 7, at 1 (“[T]he number of countries and companies 
investing in space systems and their downstream applications continues to 
grow.”). 
 35. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2. 
 36. Id.; OECD, supra note 7, at 7 (“Small satellites have become in the past 
five years more attractive than ever, due to their lower development costs and 
shorter production lead times.”). 
 37. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2. 
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as the companies prefer to have their own launches so they can 
choose their own launch dates.38 
The new movement in space transportation, “NewSpace,” 
reflects this need for entrepreneurship and innovation in order 
to meet the demand in the smallsat market.39 Launch service 
providers are developing special vehicles that make it easier for 
smallsats to reach orbit.40 SpaceX, for example, made aerospace 
history on March 30, 2017, when it reused a rocket.41 
Unfortunately, NewSpace does not provide an immediate 
solution to the lack of smallsat launch services.42 Profit-driven 
companies simply prefer to launch their satellites on an 
available foreign launch vehicle instead of waiting until 
domestic launch service industries catch up to speed.43 The most 
popular of these foreign launch vehicles is India’s PSLV, a rocket 
that caters towards smallsats,44 which attracts worldwide 
demand.45 On February 15, 2017, the PSLV successfully 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Gerrard Cowan, It’s a New Space Age for Satellite Builders, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 3, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-a-new-space-age-for-
satellite-builders-1475460122. 
 40. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2; Oleson, supra note 26 (“The lack of 
dedicated launch vehicles to deliver smallsats to their preferred orbits has 
attracted more than a dozen potential new entrants to the launch services 
business.”); e.g., FAAOCST, supra note 4, at Orbital Launch Vehicle Fact Sheets 
(stating that Firefly Space Systems is designing an “aerospike” engine, redirects 
the exhaust in a way that makes the engine lighter and more efficient, and is 
specifically catered towards smallsats); LauncherOne Service Guide Version 
2.0, VIRGIN GALACTIC 2 (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.virgingalactic.com/assets/
uploads/2014/11/VG_LauncherOne_ServiceGuide_v0.2_OSR.pdf (showing how 
Virgin Galactic is designing an airplane to send the small payloads into orbit). 
 41. James Dean, SpaceX Launches, Lands Used Falcon 9 Rocket in Historic 
First, FLA. TODAY (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.floridatoday.com/story/tech/
science/space/spacex/2017/03/30/spacex-launches-lands-falcon9-in-historic-
mission-kennedy-space-center-florida-ses10/99815686/. 
 42. See FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2. 
 43. Cody Knipfer, Of India and ICBMs: Two Current Concerns for 
American Small-Satellite Launch, SPACE REV. (Apr. 25, 2016), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2969/1 (“American small-satellite 
manufacturers and operators, many of whom have plans to fly large 
constellations of Earth observation or telecommunications spacecraft, want to 
use now whatever launch platforms that are available and affordable.”). 
 44. See id. (“[T]he PSLV is a substantially cheaper platform with greater 
capabilities than most of its competition.”). 
 45. See Peter B. de Selding, India’s ISRO: Protectionist Satellite Telecom 
Policy Is Good Business for Us, SPACE INTEL REP. (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.spaceintelreport.com/indias-isro-protectionist-satellite-telecom-
policy-is-good-business-for-us/ (“The PSLV launch vehicle has seen a 
substantial growth in its appeal to non-Indian operators of small, and some not-
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launched a payload of 104 foreign satellites into orbit,46 
shattering the previously-held record by Russia for the most 
number of satellites sent into space on a single launch.47 
However, India subsidizes the PSLV,48 and American 
launch service providers worry that they cannot compete with 
the prices.49 Fortunately for the American providers, the United 
States has a longstanding policy against satellite exports (in 
other words, importing launch services) by American 
manufacturers.50 The United States defends its policy by 
arguing that freely exporting satellites threatens to destroy its 
launch service industry.51 
 
 
so-small, commercial Earth observation satellites . . . . The office of India’s 
prime minister said revenue from foreign satellite owners using the PSLV 
rocket between 2013 and 2015 totaled $101 million.”); Malavika Vyawahare, 
ISRO Launch: Why US Companies Face Trouble Engaging with India’s Space 
Agency, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/isro-launch-why-us-companies-face-trouble-engaging-with-india-s-
space-agency/story-CiPWjGho5zsk08tigBJLLJ.html (“The reason ISRO [owner 
of the PSLV] is preferred by foreign companies for satellite launches [is] because 
it is able to send them to space at a cheaper rate compared to an American 
company like SpaceX.”). 
 46. ISROSets Space Record: Highlights of Successful Launch of 
Cartosat-2 and 103 Other Satellites, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/final-countdown-isro-hours-away-
from-record-launch-of-104-satellites-into-space/story-yfC70LKVupmiagGxWvn
W0I.html; see also Peter B. de Selding, U.S. Policy on India’s Rockets: Dead Man 
Walking, SPACE INTEL REP. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.spaceintelreport.
com/us-policy-on-indias-rockets-dead-man-walking/ (“The successful launch 
Feb. 15 [sic] of India’s PSLV rocket carrying 104 satellites testifies to the 
vehicle’s increasing flexibility and a much-needed provider of launch services 
for owners of very small satellites for commercial companies and research 
organizations.”). 
 47. See ISROSets Space Record: Highlights of Successful Launch of 
Cartosat-2 and 103 Other Satellites, supra note 46 (“It puts a wide margin 
between it and the next record holder, the Russian Space Agency that launched 
37 satellites in 2014.”). 
 48. See Knipfer, supra note 43 (“The PSLV was developed as an ISRO 
program, and the profits made off commercial launch feeds back into India’s 
space budget. This does constitute government subsidy of the Indian launch 
market; in contrast, the American companies developing small launch vehicles 
have done so largely through private investment, with NASA purchasing their 
services through fixed-price contracts.”); see also Madanapalle, supra note 9 
(“[T]he [U.S.] committee [on Science, Space, and Technology] found that India 
was ‘dumping’ the launch vehicles in the commercial market to the detriment 
of US firms.”). 
 49. See Madanapalle, supra note 9. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Vyawahare, supra note 45. 
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Profit is not the only concern in the international trade of 
launch services. Some countries are reluctant to send their 
satellites to foreigners because they worry that the sensitive 
technology risks national security.52 In fact, some countries 
perceive trading satellites to be so dangerous that they have 
formed international regimes for protection.53 The most 
prominent is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).54 
It is “an informal and voluntary association of countries which 
share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery 
systems.”55 
The MTCR regulates trade with a set of guidelines in the 
form of two categories of items.56 “Complete rocket and 
unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including . . . space launch 
vehicles . . . )” are the first category,57 and these items are 
generally banned as exports.58 The guidelines give more export-
flexibility to the second category of items, which consists of 
missiles that may have uses other than delivering weapons of 
mass destruction.59 
Most importantly, the MTCR Guidelines explicitly state 
that they are “not designed to impede national space programs 
or international cooperation in such programs as long as such 
programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons 
of mass destruction.”60 Simply put, the MTCR discourages 
cooperation when it threatens world security, but otherwise 
encourages countries to cooperate in launching innocuous items 
such as telecommunication satellites.61 
 
 
 
 52. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 417; see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE AND 
STATE, RISK ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES SPACE EXPORT CONTROL POLICY 
2 (2012) [hereinafter RISK ASSESSMENT]. 
 53. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 418–21 (introducing the different 
regimes that govern national security for satellite exports). 
 54. See id. at 421 (explaining that other armament-related export regimes 
should not control items that are already covered by the MTCR). 
 55. Id. at 418. 
 56. Id. at 419. 
 57. MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, 
MISSILE TECH. CONTROL REGIME, http://mtcr.info/mtcr-guidelines/ (last visited 
June 3, 2017) [hereinafter MCTR Guidelines]. 
 58. Fenema, supra note 24, at 419 (“[These items] are licensed for export 
only on rare occasions.”). 
 59. See MTCR Guidelines, supra note 57. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 419. 
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The United States has been a member of the MTCR since its 
establishment in 1987.62 India became the newest member in 
June of 2016.63 Membership in this regime puts countries in a 
better position to conduct more launches because it garners trust 
from the other members.64 India, for example, gained “access to 
high-end testing technology for its solid rocket booster 
propulsion system, which fires up the first stage of the [PSLV],” 
when it became a member of the MTCR.65 
United States legislation has dealt with the national 
security aspects of satellite exports. “Until the late 1980s, 
[United States] export regulations distinguished between 
communications satellites built for military, defence and 
national security purposes and satellites destined for civil and/or 
commercial use . . . .”66 During this time, the Executive branch 
decided whether the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR), controlled by the strict Department of State,67 or Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), controlled by the 
Department of Commerce,68 applied.69 
 
 
 
 
 62. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), NUCLEAR THREAT 
INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technology-
control-regime-mtcr/ (last updated Feb. 1, 2017). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See MTCR Membership to Help India Export Satellites and Launch 
Vehicles: Govt, DECCAN CHRONICLE, July 21, 2016, http://www.deccanchronicle.
com/nation/current-affairs/210716/mtcr-membership-to-help-india-export-
satellites-and-launch-vehicles-govt.html. 
 65. Pranab Dhal Samanta, ISRO Aided by India’s Entry into Elite MTCR 
Club, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/news/science/isro-aided-by-indias-entry-into-elite-mtcr-club/articleshow/
57195341.cms. 
 66. Fenema, supra note 24, at 429. 
 67. ITAR and EAR compliance, WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.techtarget.com/
definition/ITAR-and-EAR-compliance (last updated Feb. 2012) (“[ITAR is] 
[s]trict regulatory licensing—does not address commercial or research 
objectives.”); The International Traffic in Arms Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar.html (last updated 
Sept. 6, 2017). 
 68. Export Licensing, (ITAR and EAR), U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU 
OF INDUS. AND SEC. (May 2013), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-doc
uments/technology-evaluation/781-export-licensing/file (“The U.S. Department 
of Commerce is responsible for implementing and enforcing EAR.”). 
 69. Fenema, supra note 24, at 429–30. 
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The enactment of the Strom Thurmond Act in 1998,70 a 
reaction to international tension at the time,71 drastically 
changed this procedure.72 The Act stated that 
[D]ue to the military sensitivity of the technologies 
involved, it is in the national security interest of the 
United States that United States satellites and related 
items be subject to the same export controls that apply 
under United States law and practices to munitions . . . 
all satellites and related items that are on the Commerce 
Control List of dual-use items . . . shall be transferred to 
the United States Munitions List . . . .73 
 In other words, the executive branch no longer had the 
power to determine that a satellite could receive lenient export 
controls under the EAR instead of the strict ITAR controls.74 
The new categorical regulation severely hindered the 
United States satellite industry: 
[T]he value of contracts lost due to ITAR between 2003 
and 2006 was 2.35 billion dollars . . . . In 1995, United 
States satellite manufacturers enjoyed a 75 percent 
share of the global market; ten years later, this has 
dropped to 41 percent, and has hovered between 35 and 
50 percent since then. ITAR has become a market 
differentiator . . . .75 
The United States satellite industry begged for reform, and 
its backlash about overregulation eventually reached 
 
 70. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261 §§ 1511–1516, 112 Stat. 1920, 2173–2178 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2017)) [hereinafter Strom Thurmond 
National Defense Authorization Act]. 
 71. Fenema, supra note 24, at 430–31 (explaining that the fear that the 
Chinese obtained sensitive United States technology resulted in the adoption of 
the Act). 
 72. Id. at 431. 
 73. Id.; Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act §§ 1511, 
1513. 
 74. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 431. 
 75. Export Controls, Arms Sales, and Reform: Balancing U.S. Interests, 
Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 31 (2012) 
(statement of Patricia A. Cooper, President, Satellite Industry Association) 
[hereinafter Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs]. 
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Congress.76 In 2012, the State and Defense Departments 
submitted a report to Congress that outlined many of the defects 
of the current export regime.77 It stated that “[t]he U.S. 
Government’s control of commercial satellites . . . as munitions 
items is not effective in protecting U.S. national security because 
some dual-use satellites . . . equivalent to those originating in 
the United States are available from non-U.S. providers.”78 It 
also noted that “[o]ver the last [fifteen] years, a substantial 
number of commercial satellite systems . . . have become less 
critical to national security[,] [and] [d]uring that time, other 
countries have become more proficient in space technologies.”79 
For these reasons, the report recommended that the “authority 
to determine the appropriate export control status of satellites 
and space-related items be returned to the President.”80 
Congress listened, and in 2013, it enacted the National 
Defense Authorization Act,81 which returned the power to 
determine satellite export controls to the executive branch.82 As 
a result, innocuous items such as telecommunication satellite 
exports were to be controlled by lenient Department of 
Commerce controls instead of automatically being controlled by 
strict Department of State controls.83 
B. THE UNITED STATES-INDIA CONFLICT 
The ongoing conflict between the United States and India 
hinges on India’s refusal to sign the CSLA.84 Without India’s 
signature, the United States bans its smallsat companies from 
freely launching on the highly-coveted PSLV.85 Although 
protests from the smallsat companies have pressured the United 
States into allowing waivers to the ban,86 the United States only 
grants these waivers on a case-by-case basis.87 Smallsat 
 
 76. Fenema, supra note 24, at 435. 
 77. Id. 
 78. RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 52, at 1. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted); see also Fenema, supra note 
24, at 435. 
 82. Fenema, supra note 24, at 435. 
 83. See id. at 435–36. 
 84. See Listner, supra note 13. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Vyawahare, supra note 45. 
 87. Id. (“If American companies must launch in India they need to apply 
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companies greatly prefer to launch at whim on the PSLV.88 
The CSLA protects the American industry from competing 
with subsidized markets.89 It prohibits government owned 
foreign launch service providers from selling launch services at 
prices lower than those offered by the United States.90 The 
United States launch service industry insists that the 
prohibition is necessary to prevent itself from being overrun.91 
India, however, refuses to accept the agreement.92 India 
feels that its low prices can make it a prominent player in the 
international satellite launch market even without the 
launching of American satellites.93 Because the CSLA only 
applies to government-owned launch service providers, India 
can circumvent it by privatizing the PSLV.94 In fact, India 
already has plans to do so by 2020.95 Privatizing launch services 
promises to reduce the cost of launches, increase satellite 
capacity per launch, and increase the quantity of launches per 
year.96 
 
 
for a waiver, which is approved on a case to case basis.”). 
 88. See id. (explaining that United States policy is detrimental to countries 
with immediate launch needs). 
 89. Listner, supra note 13. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Selding, supra note 8 (“The rationale is that these non-U.S. launchers, 
not bound by the constraints of profit and loss – [sic] but hungry for hard-
currency export earnings – [sic] will undercut commercial U.S. companies’ 
launch prices and keep them from gaining market traction.”). 
 92. Listner, supra note 13. 
 93. See Vyawahare, supra note 45 (indicating that many other countries 
are vying for India’s launch services). 
 94. Listner, supra note 13. 
 95. Srinivas Laxman, Plan to Largely Privatize PSLV Operations by 2020: 
Isro Chief, TIMES OF INDIA (Feb. 15, 2016, 9:15 AM IST), http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/Plan-to-largely-privatize-PSLV-operations-by-2020-Isro-
chief/articleshow/50990145.cms (“[T]he operation of [the Indian space 
program’s] workhorse—the [PSLV]—will be largely privatized in four years.”). 
 96. Id. (“[T]he advantage of largely privatizing the PSLV operations is to 
boost capacity and consequently increase the rate of launches from 12 to 18 [sic] 
annually.”); see Aditya Madanapalle, Isro Plans to Involve Indian Industries to 
Increase Satellite Launch Capacity, FIRSTPOST (Feb. 3, 2017, 12:01 IST), http://
tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/isro-plans-to-involve-indian-industries-to-
increase-satellite-launch-capacity-360615.html. 
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C. OTHER CONFLICTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF 
LAUNCH SERVICES 
The United States-India conflict is not the first involving the 
international trade of launch services. In 1984, Transpace 
Carriers Inc. (TCI), a United States launch service provider, 
accused Arianespace of receiving subsidies.97 Europe countered 
that the United States restricted its satellite market to United 
States launch service providers only.98 The President of the 
United States eventually determined that he would not take 
action against Europe.99 
In 1989, the United States signed an agreement with China 
that allowed the Eastern power, for the first time, to launch 
satellites manufactured in the United States.100 The United 
States worried that China would run away with the satellite 
market if left on its own, so the United States-China Agreement 
contained two limitations: launch quota and price.101 In 1990, 
China launched a satellite at half the price that Arianespace was 
offering.102 In response, Arianespace accused China of violating 
the Agreement even though Arianespace was never a party to 
it.103 In the end, the United States took no effective enforcement 
action.104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 97. Fenema, supra note 24, at 449. 
 98. Frans von der Dunk, International Trade Aspects of Space Services, in 
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 24, at 837. 
 99. Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 50 Fed. Reg. 
140, 29631 (July 17, 1985); see Dunk, supra note 98, at 838. 
 100. Fenema, supra note 24, at 444. 
 101. Id; see Dunk, supra note 98, at 840. 
 102. H.P. Van Fenema, Cooperation and Competition in Space 
Transportation, in THE HIGHWAYS OF AIR AND OUTER SPACE OVER ASIA 235 
(C.J. Cheng & P.M.J. Mendes de Leon eds., 1992). 
 103. Id; see Dunk, supra note 98, at 841. 
 104. Fenema, supra note 24. 
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D. SPACE LAW 
Space law mandates international cooperation.105 The Outer 
Space Treaty, which all major launching nations have ratified,106 
states that “[i]n the exploration and use of outer space . . . States 
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-
operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all of their 
activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding 
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”107 
E. THE GATS 
The WTO consists of the WTO Agreement and annexed 
agreements, which include the GATS.108 Together, they contain 
the rules on international trade and a Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) for enforcing disputes.109 
The WTO pursues liberalized world trade.110 The key to 
trade liberalization is the breaking down of trade barriers at 
national borders.111 The principle of comparative advantage, 
which holds that countries will always increase their wealth by 
 
 105. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies art. IX, Jan. 27, 1967, 18.3 U.S.T 2410 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION [hereinafter WTO], 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited June 22, 
2017) (“Foremost is the Agreement Establishing the WTO (or the WTO 
Agreement), which serves as an umbrella agreement. Annexed are the 
agreements on goods, services and intellectual property, dispute settlement, 
trade policy review mechanism and the plurilateral agreements.”). 
 109. See Overview: A Navigational Guide, WTO, https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm, (last visited June 22, 2017) 
(“[The WTO agreements] spell out the principles of liberalization, and the 
permitted exceptions. They include individual countries’ commitments to lower 
customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open services 
markets.”); Dispute Settlement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited June 22, 2017) (“Resolving trade disputes is 
one of the core activities of the WTO.”). 
 110. See What is the World Trade Organization?, WTO, https://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited June 24, 2017). 
 111. See id. (“The [WTO] system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as 
freely as possible—so long as there are no undesirable side-effects—because this 
is important for economic development and well-being. That partly means 
removing obstacles.”). 
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removing trade barriers,112 already incentivizes countries to 
trade with one another.113 However, domestic policies frequently 
obstruct this from happening.114 
The GATS confines its focus to liberalizing trade in 
services.115 For example, the market access provisions, found in 
Article XVI, prohibit measures that limit the “number of service 
suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas” or “the total 
number of service operations.”116 In a similar vein, the national 
treatment provisions, found in Article XVII, prohibit member 
states from indirectly favoring domestic suppliers by obligating 
them to treat all foreign suppliers as nationals.117 
But the application of these provisions is not automatic. The 
GATS allows countries to limit the amount of market access and 
national treatment they pledge in their schedule of 
commitments,118 which contradicts the principle of comparative 
advantage.119 Additionally, the provisions do not apply to 
government procurement.120 Article XIII states that “Articles . . . 
XVI (market access) and XVII (national treatment) shall not 
apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the 
procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale 
or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial 
sale.”121 
The GATS also addresses national security.122 In order to 
protect states’ security interests, Article XIV states that 
 
 112. See The Case for Open Trade, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (describing protectionism as a “siren call” that yields short-term 
profits at the expense of greater long-term benefits). 
 115. See Overview: A Navigational Guide, supra note 109 (showing that the 
GATS covers services). 
 116. See GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XVI, ¶¶ 2(a), 
2(c), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter 
GATS]. 
 117. See GATS art. XVII. 
 118. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the 
List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited June 24, 2017) (“For each service 
sector or sub-sector that is offered, the schedule must indicate, with respect to 
each of the four modes of supply, any limitations on market access or national 
treatment which are to be maintained.”). 
 119. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 112. 
 120. See GATS art. XIII:1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. GATS Art. XIV bis. 
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“[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed to require any 
Member to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to its essential security interests.”123 
Subsidies and emergency safeguards, addressed by Articles 
XV and X respectively, do not contain binding language like the 
articles covering market access, national treatment, or security 
interests.124 Instead, they are part of the so-called “built-in 
agenda.”125 “The [built-in agenda] reflects both the fact that not 
all services-related negotiations could be concluded within the 
time frame of the Uruguay Round, and that Members have 
already committed themselves . . . to successive rounds aimed at 
achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization.”126 
Article X, for instance, calls for prompt negotiations on 
emergency safeguards.127 Likewise, Article XV requires that 
states negotiate on subsidies in order to “develop[] the necessary 
multilateral disciplines to avoid [their] trade-distortive 
effects.”128 In the meantime, it promises to give those hurt by 
subsidies “sympathetic consideration.”129 The Sixth WTO 
Ministerial Declaration instructed negotiators to “intensify their 
efforts to conclude the negotiations on rule-making.”130 
 
 
 
 123. GATS XIV bis 1(a). 
 124. See GATS art. XV and X. 
 125. See The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, 
Coverage and Disciplines, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017) (“[V]arious GATS Articles 
provide for issue-specific negotiations intended to define rules and disciplines 
for domestic regulation (Article VI), emergency safeguards (Article X), 
government procurement (Article XIII), and subsidies (Article XV). These 
negotiations are currently under way.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See GATS art. X. 
 128. See GATS art. XV. 
 129. GATS art. XV ¶ 2. 
 130. See Ministerial Declaration: Annexes Adopted on 18 December 2005, 
WTO, Annex C, ¶ 4, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min05_e/final_annex_e.htm. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF LAUNCH SERVICES 
REQUIRES INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
Countries struggle to cooperate with each other in the 
international trade of launch services. Providers often accuse 
foreign countries of violating trade rules.131 When this happens, 
countries typically retaliate by claiming that they, too, are 
victims of trade violations.132 These conflicts lead to trade 
protectionism, as witnessed in the current stand-off between the 
United States and India.133 The United States is blocking India 
from freely launching United States satellites because India is 
allegedly subsidizing its launch services.134 
Noncooperation and protectionism is problematic for several 
reasons. First, it handicaps the space economy,135 of which the 
United States is particularly illustrative. When the Strom-
Thurmond Act was in force, the United States satellite industry 
reported losses in the billions and a dramatic drop in market 
share.136 Though Congress eventually repealed the 
legislation,137 the satellite industry continues to struggle as a 
result of United States policy with India.138 The inability of the 
smallsat market to take off substantially reduces the economic 
potential of the space industry because telecommunication 
services are its largest subsector.139 
 
 131. See, e.g., Fenema, supra note 24, at 449 (stating that TCI accused 
Arianespace of launching subsidized rockets); Fenema, supra note 105 (stating 
that Arianespace accused China of subsidizing and dumping); Listner, supra 
note 13 (stating that the United States accuses India of subsidizing its launch 
services). 
 132. See, e.g., Fenema, supra note 24, at 449 (detailing how Europe 
retaliated that the United States limits its satellite market to domestic 
launchers); Listner, supra note 13 (detailing how India retaliates that the 
United States is restricting its satellite market to domestic launchers). 
 133. See Vyawahare, supra note 45 (showing how the conflict between India 
and the United States limits the United States from importing Indian launch 
services). 
 134. Id. (explaining how United States satellites must go through a 
complicated waiver process). 
 135. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 116. 
 136. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 75. 
 137. Dunk, supra note 98, at 435. 
 138. Madanapalle, supra note 9. 
 139. See Fed. Aviation Admin. Office of Comm. Space Transp., supra note 4, 
at 2 (“[T]he commercial launch pie has not grown significantly during the past 
decade . . . . There are some signs the commercial launch pie may be expanding, 
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Second, countries’ refusal to trade launch services 
constitutes a violation of space law. The Outer Space Treaty 
states that “[i]n the exploration and use of outer space . . . States 
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-
operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all of their 
activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding 
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”140 Launch 
services are certainly an outer space activity, so conflicts such as 
United States-India are in breach of space law.141 
Third, noncooperation blocks access to new business 
opportunities. NewSpace is introducing new types of vehicles 
that achieve economies of scale.142 SpaceX, for example, can now 
earn greater revenue with less production costs because of its 
reusable rocket.143 Greater economies of scale create business 
opportunities by broadening trade space.144 However, the 
inability to contract with foreign entities limits companies from 
taking advantage of these fresh opportunities.145 Thus, 
NewSpace adds tremendous pressure for international 
cooperation.146 
Last, the demand for telecommunication services is 
geographically shifting. Countries such as India have enormous 
populations that are just beginning to go online.147 The growing 
Eastern demand can cripple Western launch industries if they 
neglect trade.148 Therefore, the changing demand for 
 
however. Several new launch vehicles are being developed specifically to 
address what some believe is latent demand among small satellite operators.”); 
id. at 1 (“At $95 billion in revenues, or about 29 percent, satellite television 
represents the largest segment of activity.”). 
 140. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, art. IX (emphasis added). 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Economies of Scale and Scope, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/12446567 (“Economies of scale are factors that 
cause the average cost of producing something to fall as the volume of its output 
increases.”). 
 143. Specifically, SpaceX is achieving “technical” economies of scale. See 
Kimberly Amadeo, Economies of Scale, THE BALANCE (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/economies-of-scale-3305926 (“Technical economies 
of scale result from efficiencies in the production process itself.”). 
 144. See Oleson, supra note 26 (“The joint effects of all these changes [that 
new launch vehicles cause] will expand the trade space for aerospace systems 
engineering.”). 
 145. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 112. 
 146. See Oleson, supra note 26 (explaining how NewSpace requires 
adaptability in the launch industry). 
 147. See Park, supra note 31. 
 148. See Dunk, supra note 98, at 839 (explaining how the United States has 
2018] GATS REGULATION FOR LAUNCH SERVICES 301 
telecommunication services threatens to further rupture the 
space economy. 
On the other hand, trade in launch services is brim with 
potential if launch nations reduce protectionism.149 All stand to 
benefit from increased trade because of the principle of 
comparative advantage,150 and the untapped profit is 
astronomical given the size of the space economy.151 Thus, if the 
goal is to maximize wealth, launch nations must find a way to 
cooperate. 
B. THE GATS FACILITATES COOPERATION IN THE TRADE OF 
LAUNCH SERVICES 
The GATS can facilitate the necessary cooperation,152 as it 
provides a regulatory framework where countries can trade 
launch services effectively.153 
Analyzing the United States–India conflict is an excellent 
demonstration of this because it is a microcosm of the global 
situation. Its central issues have already occurred in previous 
conflicts. Like the United States, TCI alleged subsidization,154 
and like India, Arianespace counter-alleged that the United 
States restricted the use of its satellite market to United States 
launch vehicles only.155 Similarly, Arianespace’s allegation that 
China violated the United States–China Agreement served as a 
precursor to the ongoing United States insistence that India sign 
the CSLA because the United States, like Arianespace, wants 
regulation.156 Neither of the previous conflicts witnessed any 
 
already created launch service agreements with Eastern countries like Russia 
and China stemming from fears that Eastern launch services providers could 
otherwise overrun their own domestic launch service industry). 
 149. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 112. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Fed. Aviation Admin. Office of Comm. Space Transp., supra note 4 
(“The size of the global space industry . . . is estimated to be about $324 
billion.”). 
 152. See Dunk, supra note 101, at 843 (explaining that once launch services 
become more privatized and routine, that the GATS would be the best approach 
to a trading regime). 
 153. Id. at 841 (“The unilateral character of these agreements 
notwithstanding, the result of an embryonic global trade regime in launch 
services—in the place, as it were, of any GATS/WTO-oriented approach—
continued to shimmer through.”). 
 154. See id. at 837. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. at 841. 
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sort of resolution.157 As a result, resolving the United 
States-India conflict solves many issues that have been left 
unsettled. 
The analysis proceeds by first demonstrating how the GATS 
can resolve the United States-India conflict, and then debunking 
the typical misconceptions that arise when considering the 
GATS control of launch services. 
1. The GATS Can Resolve the United States-India Conflict 
The GATS framework allows India to launch American 
satellites at whim on the PSLV without undermining the United 
States launch service industry.158 With this in mind, both 
countries should seek GATS regulation immediately.159 The 
United States can finally end the tension between its satellite 
and launch industries and soothe domestic relations.160 India 
holds a crucial bargaining chip because it owns the world’s most 
successful smallsat rocket at a time when smallsats are 
desperately seeking orbit.161 Although India boasts that it can 
take charge in the market without launching United States 
rockets,162 the innovative United States launch service industry 
will soon catch up to speed.163 Therefore, it is in India’s best 
interests to negotiate trading rules during the short time it has 
leverage.164 
 
 157. Id. at 838, 841. 
 158. See Yun Zhao, Liberalization of Space Launch Services within a 
Plurilateral Regime, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 433, 441 (2006) (finding the WTO 
to be the best way to liberalize trade in launch services, and that the United 
States cannot continue to isolate itself in the face of growing world competition). 
 159. See Oleson, supra note 26 (“Large rewards await those who adapt most 
effectively to the new opportunities [arising from increased trade space in the 
space industry].”). 
 160. See Selding, supra note 8 (“One small satellite owner said his company 
would go out of business if it had to wait for a reliable and cost-effective U.S. 
small satellite launch industry to be created.”). 
 161. See Selding, supra note 45 (stating that the PSLV is appealing to 
smallsats from countries across the globe). 
 162. Vyawahare, supra note 45 (quoting an Indian official that states that 
ISRO does not need customers from the United States). 
 163. Madanapalle, supra note 9 (“The good times for Isro will stop as soon 
as the US launch industry further matures and once the next generation of US 
launch vehicles in development can serve the needs of US satellite launches.”). 
 164. See Listner, supra note 13 (“India is primed to become a player in the 
commercial space but its continued reticence to create a legal and regulatory 
regime to allow commercial space activities by its private citizens risks its space 
industry to be left behind.”). 
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The GATS specifically helps the United States by giving 
them an advantage at a crucial moment in international 
lawmaking.165 Article XV awards the United States 
“sympathetic consideration” as victim to India’s subsidized 
launch services.166 
Having “sympathetic consideration” is key in trade 
negotiation because the GATS, though lacking in binding 
language, vehemently condemns subsidization. Article XV 
requires that countries negotiate in order to “develop[] the 
necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid [their] trade-
distortive effects.”167 The legal obligation to discuss rules on 
subsidies is an example of how extremely uncomfortable the 
members of the GATS system are with allowing countries to 
trade unfairly. The Sixth WTO Ministerial Declaration adds to 
the urgency to create rules on subsidies by demanding that 
countries “intensify their efforts to conclude the negotiations on 
rule-making.” Therefore, the United States can expect the 
“sympathetic consideration” to be substantial. 
As such, the United States finds itself in a strong legal 
position at a very pivotal moment in international lawmaking. 
Countries must write trade rules on launch services 
immediately given the harm without them.168 The United States 
is under additional pressure because of the accelerating demand 
for launch services in the East.169 Negotiating defensive trade 
rules on launch services with Eastern powers is nothing new to 
the United States.170 The United States-China Agreement, with 
its launch and price quotas, is an example of the United States’ 
 
 165. See Dunk, supra note 98, at 841–43 (explaining how the GATS ban on 
subsidies may be crucial once countries such as India start providing launch 
services). 
 166. See GATS art. XV, ¶ 2. 
 167. GATS art. XV. 
 168. See Kniper, supra note 43 (“Some companies are privately suggesting 
that they may not be able to sustain business operations unless dedicated small-
satellite launchers become available in a short time.”). 
 169. See generally Yee Xiang Yun, Demand Rising in Asia-Pacific for More 
Powerful Satellites, THE STAR ONLINE (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.thestar.com.
my/business/business-news/2017/08/07/demand-rising-in-asiapacific-for-more-
powerful-satellites/ (noting the growing demand in Asia for satellite launch 
services). 
 170. See Dunk, supra note 101, at 839 (“[Years ago,] fears arose in the 
Western world that Chinese, Russian, and Ukrainian launchers would undercut 
their global market shares by offering services at a much lower price. As the 
United States controlled the satellite manufacturing industry . . . it took the 
first steps to provide ‘rules of the road’ for establishment of a somewhat level 
playing field in global launch services.”). 
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prior history of bargaining with Eastern powers to mitigate their 
strengthening launch services.171 Thus, it is in the best interests 
of the United States to draw multilateral trade rules now while 
it has legal bonuses such as “sympathetic consideration.”172 
The GATS also helps India.173 Specifically, the GATS 
improves India’s access to United States satellites. The CSLA 
requirement that India price its services either at or above 
United States prices violates the GATS because it is a limitation 
on a service.174 Any limit on the total value of service 
transactions, unless otherwise specified within the schedule of 
commitments, is a violation of Article XVI.175 
Albeit, the United States can avoid the violation by limiting 
market access or national treatment obligations in its schedule 
of commitments.176 Both of these courses of action defeat the 
whole purpose of including launch services in the GATS and 
make India unlikely to commit to GATS regulation.177 
Fortunately, this will not be the case because the GATS, as 
discussed above, is also crucial to the United States.178 
Therefore, the GATS improves India’s ability to launch United 
States satellites. 
Some aspects of the GATS are equally beneficial to both the 
United States and India. For example, the provision on 
emergency safeguards incentivizes the two countries to 
incorporate GATS regulation in the international trade of 
launch services because with it, the United States does not have 
to worry about the destruction of its domestic launch service 
industry, which means that India can export launch services 
more easily.179 
 
 171. Id. at 840. 
 172. See id. at 841. 
 173. See Listner, supra note 13 (“Whatever the rationale for India’s 
reluctance to adopt a space policy and a true commercial space scheme, it pales 
in comparison to the long-term benefits and positive geopolitical effect in terms 
of prestige.”). 
 174. See GATS art. XVI, ¶ 2. 
 175. See Guide to reading the GATS schedules of specific commitments and 
the list of article II (MFN) exemptions, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2017). 
 176. GATS Art. XVII. 
 177. See Knipfer, supra note 43 (noting market forces surrounding U.S. 
protectionist policy and India PSLV providers). 
 178. See id. (explaining how the United States smallsat market needs access 
to the PSLV). 
 179. See id. (explaining how the United States is willing to freely import 
launch services from India so long as its home market survives). 
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The United States may counter that it does not matter that 
the GATS contains emergency safeguard measures if there is no 
express permission to use them; they are merely part of the 
built-in agenda.180 This is not the case. Notwithstanding the lack 
of binding language, the GATS fiercely supports the use of 
emergency safeguard measures. 
The GATS will not idly witness the destruction of one of its 
member’s industries without a whole-hearted attempt to find a 
solution. Article X explicitly states “there shall be multilateral 
negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard 
measures.”181 Moreover, the Sixth WTO Ministerial Declaration 
demands that countries “intensify their efforts to conclude the 
negotiations on rule-making.”182 The sense of urgency shows 
that the GATS should apply at least some sort of legality to 
safeguards until the negotiations reach a conclusion.183 Thus, 
the GATS will fervently strive to protect the United States 
launch service industry if it ever reaches dire straits.184 
Comity also obligates India to allow the United States to 
exercise emergency safeguards if its launch service industry ever 
faces destruction. Trade in launch services already abides by 
comity. The MTCR, for example, is voluntary and informal,185 
yet members continue to cooperate for the mutual benefit of 
 
 180. See GATS art. X. 
 181. Id. 
 182. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, Annex A, WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_
e/min05_e/final_annex_e.htm (emphasis added). 
 183. See Gregory Shaffer et. al., Indian Trade Lawyers and the Building of 
State Trade-Related Legal Capacity, U. OF MINN. L. SCH. 1 (2014), 
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/shaffer/pdfs/2016%20Indian%20Trade
%20Lawyers%20and%20the%20Building%20of%20State%20Trade-Related%
20Legal%20Capacity.pdf (“The WTO should not be viewed as static and 
deterministic, autonomously affecting states. Rather, the WTO legal order is 
shaped by those who negotiate its terms and who participate in their 
interpretation, affecting how WTO law is understood and applied. The 
negotiation and interpretation of WTO law, in turn, affects countries’ policy 
space for social and developmental initiatives as well as their ability to 
challenge foreign countries’ trade restrictions affecting their exports. The scope 
of the WTO legal order entails not only formal disputes, which are of great 
interest and generate reams of scholarship, but also the shadow effects of law 
on claims that are settled and never known and on domestic regulatory policy 
initiatives that are advanced, not considered, or are shelved.”). 
 184. See id. at 7 (noting examples when prior WTO action spurred states to 
exercise emergency safeguards). 
 185. See MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology 
Annex, supra note 57. 
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reducing the risks of weapons proliferation.186 Similarly, trade 
in launch services depends on cooperation for the mutual benefit 
of comparative advantage.187 India is undermining international 
prosperity if it launches United States satellites without any 
regard for the well-being of the United States launch industry.188 
Therefore, the United States can expect India to allow for 
emergency safeguards for reasons of comity. 
The United States can also trust that India will allow it to 
exercise safeguards because of space law. The Outer Space 
Treaty states that “[i]n the exploration and use of outer space . . . 
States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of 
co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all of their 
activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding 
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”189 If the United 
States satellite industry ever faces trouble, India violates space 
law if it refuses to allow the United States to exercise emergency 
safeguards because that is blatant disregard for the 
“corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the 
Treaty.”190 As a result, the United States can exercise GATS 
emergency safeguards if necessary.191 
Another aspect of the GATS that benefits both India and the 
United States is the DSB. When TCI complained that 
Arianespace was being subsidized, the United States 
government did nothing about it.192 When Arianespace 
complained that China was violating the United States-China 
agreement, no enforcement action occurred.193 The lack of 
enforcement is problematic because it discourages countries and 
companies from trusting one another.194 Therefore, the United 
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States should be willing to commit its launch service industry 
under the GATS because it contains enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure that India stays true to the trade rules.195 Likewise, India 
should be secure in knowing that the DSB prevents the United 
States from breaching its own obligations, such as failing to 
abide by its schedule of commitments.196 
The analysis above illustrates how the GATS preserves the 
United States launch industry even with waiver-less imports of 
India’s launch services, and why both countries should seek 
GATS regulation immediately. 
2. The Misconceptions of the GATS Regulation of Launch 
Services 
Naturally, entering into a trading regime brings its own set 
of issues.197 There are two major concerns that typically arise 
when considering the application of GATS regulation: 
government procurement and national security interests.198 
First, government procurement may be relevant to the 
international trade of launch services;199 even though 
privatization is sweeping the space industry,200 some state 
governments still control their own space programs.201 The 
concern is that the GATS cannot regulate trade in launch 
services because of Article XIII,202 which states that “Articles . . . 
XVI [market access] and XVII [national treatment] shall not 
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apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the 
procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale 
or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial 
sale.”203 Article XIII certainly applies to the United States-India 
conflict because the PSLV is owned and operated by the Indian 
government . . . at the moment.204 India plans to privatize the 
PSLV as early as 2020.205 The small timeframe means that any 
concern over Article XIII is short-lived.206 
National security is the second misconception that arises 
when considering GATS regulation of trade in launch services. 
Scholars argue that if the GATS controls trade in launch 
services, then Article XIV becomes the GATS “baseline rule 
instead of the exception.”207 India can argue, for instance, that 
the United States can rely on Article XIV to dodge its obligations 
by alleging that trading its satellites across borders is a security 
risk.208 However, both the United States’ own legislation and the 
MTCR demonstrate that importing launch services is a harmless 
activity. 
The repeal of the Strom-Thurmond Act in 2013, for instance, 
proves that trading launch services cannot possibly be a security 
risk.209 Although it guaranteed limited access to United States 
technology by regulating all satellite exports under the strict 
ITAR controls,210 the legislation infuriated the United States 
satellite industry which in turn pleaded for legislative reform.211 
The Departments of State and Defense themselves supported 
the satellite industry by pointing out that the “sensitive” 
technology was in fact already accessible in other countries,212 
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and “a substantial number of commercial satellite systems . . . 
have become less critical to national security.”213 The eventual 
enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2013 proves that the Strom-Thurmond Act was 
overbearing.214 Therefore, exporting satellites (or importing 
launch services) do not threaten national security.215 
The MTCR, of which both India and the United States are 
members,216 also shows how trading launch services is harmless, 
which means that countries cannot rely on the national security 
loopholes found in Article XIV. First, the MTCR is eager to 
accommodate for trade in telecommunication satellites because 
the second category allows for more flexibility.217 The guidelines 
can keep it simple by putting a general ban on everything, but 
this deters trade.218 If trading satellites is compatible with the 
regime against missile proliferation, then they must be 
innocuous. 
Second, countries already trade with each other under the 
MTCR. Although the overarching purpose of the MTCR—to 
reduce the risk of missile proliferation219—suggests that there 
should not be any liberalized trading among launch nations, the 
MTCR Guidelines explicitly state that they are “not designed to 
impede national space programs or international cooperation in 
such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to 
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.”220 Members 
to the MTCR treat this language as a blessing to fully 
cooperate221 even though exporting satellites to a foreign launch 
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service provider can arguably be seen as always improving 
another state’s missile programs.222 India, for example, can now 
access high-end technology for its PSLV because of the trust it 
earned after joining the regime.223 Therefore, trading launch 
services is safe because even the MTCR, the most prominent 
regime in mitigating the risks associated with trading launch 
services, encourages countries to cooperate. 
In sum, countries cannot claim national security risks as an 
excuse to avoid trading obligations with launch services,224 
which further paves the way for the GATS. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The value of the global space economy has soared, reaching 
a value of hundreds of billions of dollars.225 However, the 
smallsat market has not kept pace226 because smallsat 
companies cannot personalize their launch dates.227 Currently, 
the lacking launch infrastructure in the United States limits 
them to launching smallsats as secondary payloads.228 
India’s rocket, the PSLV, caters towards smallsats229 and 
earns worldwide demand.230 However, the United States 
prohibits its satellite companies from using foreign launch 
vehicles such as the PSLV.231 The United States reasons that 
subjecting its launch market to foreign competition may destroy 
it.232 
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If the United States-India conflict were regulated according 
to the GATS, then the stand-off between India and the United 
States would come to an end. This is beneficial to both countries 
because of the principle of comparative advantage.233 
Essentially, the GATS facilitates trading launch services by both 
encouraging and compelling India and the United States to 
abide by proper trade rules.234 
Although the nature of launch services suggests 
incompatibility with the GATS because of government 
procurement and national security interests,235 in reality there 
is nothing that will obstruct its application. Privatization is 
sweeping the global space industry.236 Congress once restricted 
satellite exports through legislation for security reasons, but 
repealed that legislation in 2013237 because the widespread 
availability of satellite technology makes protecting it a frivolous 
exercise.238 Even the MTCR, a regime against missile 
proliferation, encourages countries to cooperate in their trade of 
telecommunication satellites.239 
Noncooperation among the spacefaring nations, which is a 
violation of space law,240 is needlessly hampering the space 
economy.241 Countries can facilitate the growth of the space 
economy by bestowing the launch service market to the GATS. 
After all, global regulation is only a matter of time because 
international interaction is only increasing. As former President 
Jimmy Carter stated in a letter that is travelling aboard the 
Voyager spacecraft on its current voyage: “We human beings are 
still divided into nation states, but these states are rapidly 
becoming a single global civilization.”242 
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